# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

ORIGINAL

75-1136

1395

## **United States Court of Appeals**

For the Second Circuit.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee,

-against-

THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN

Defendants-Appellants

On Appeal from Order of the United States Court for the Eastern District of New York

## **Appendix**

HAROLD BORG
Attorney for Appellant
123-60 83rd Avenue
Kew Gardens, New York
Tel. (212) BU 1-1200

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Attorney for Appellee
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Tel. (212) 596-3059

DICK BAILEY PRINTERS

TEL. (212) 447-5358



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### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Docket Entries	1
Indictment	4
Charge to the Jury	
Judgment and Commitment	63
Excerpts from Trial Transcript	

CR 817 MISHLER. D. C. Form No. 100 CRIMINAL DOCKET ATTORNEYS O'BRIEN For U. S .: THE UNITED STATES WIDMAN-Jerald Rosentha 250 W. 57th Street N.Y., THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIEMAN For Defendant: Murphy: Harold Borg 123-60 83rd Ave Kew Gardens, N.Y. BU 1-1200 Bank Robbery CASH RECEIVED AND DISBURSED AMOUNT ABSTRACT OF COSTS RECEIVED DATE Notice of Appeal (no fee) 4/4/75 Fine. (BOTH DEFTS) Clerk. Marshai, Attorney, ATES COURT OF Commissioner's Court, Witnesses, APR 18 1975 DANNEL FUSARO, CI SECOND CIRCU PROCEEDINGS Before MISHLER, CH.J .- Indictment filed 12/26/74 Notice of Appearance filed as to deft Murphy. 1-8-75 Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - deft Murphy & counsel Harold 1-8-75 Borg present - deft Widman present without counsel - court to appoint counsel for deft Widman. Deft Murphy arraigned and enters a plea of not guilty - court enters a plea of not guilty as to deft Widman - bail set at \$25,000 as to deft Murphy and \$100,000 as to deft Widman - Identification hearing set down for Jan. 24, 1975 at 1:00 PM. Trial set down for Jan, 27, 1975 at 10:00 A.M. Notice of readiness for trial filed 1/13/75 Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts Murphy & Widman 1-27-75 present with counsels - hearing held on motion to suppresshearing contd to Jan. 27, 1975 at 9:30 am.

# 74CR 817

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
1-27-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts Murphy & Widman & counsels
	- Julius Science
	Pagging held on voluntariness of statements
	denied - hearing concluded - Trial contd to Jan. 28, 1975.  Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts present with attys -
1-28-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case carried - deres process.  Trial resumed - Trial contd to Jan. 29, 1975 at 10:00 em.
	5 Before MISHLER, CH J -case called - defts Murphy & Widman present
1-29-7	before MISHLER, CH 3 -case carried - deres responses at 11:15 am. with counsels - trial resumed - trial contd to 1-30-75., at 11:15 am.
-	and a defts present with active
1-30-7	5 Before MISHIER, CH J - case carried - deres protected for a judgment of trial resumed - Govt rests - motion by the defts for a judgment of
	and the denied - Deft WIDMAN rests - trial contd to 1-32.
1 21	Page MISHIFP CH J - case called - defts present with counsels
1-31-	deft Murphy rests - Motion renewd by the derte
	is denied - At 4.25 PM Jury returned with
	Tillave at a verdict on count I - sury possession
	Trial concluded - Bail conditions modified as to deft Widman to \$50,000
	surety bond signed by mother and father and a cash deposit of \$5,000.
	Bail conditions contd as to deft Murphy - all motions reserved until
	time of sentence - sentences ad a without state (Lunch)
131-7	
2-18-7	one dated Jan. 28, one dated Jan. 29, one dated Jan. 30 and one dated
	Jan. 31, 1975.
	Services filed (Widman)
2-25	Case called- Detts and counsel present
4/4/75	
	the of their out to appeal their to
	without fee as to both defts- Bail as to deft Murphy set at \$50,000.00
4/4/75	Judgments and Commitments filed- certified copies to Marshal (BOTH DEFTS)
4/4/75	1 Filed (without tee) (DUIN DUE 10)
4/4/75	Docket entries and duplicate of notice of appeal mailed to count of app
4/7/75	Certified copies of judgments and commitments retd and filed- defts del:
1. ———	to Federal Detention Headquarters -75 Stenographers transcript filed dated 4-4-75 (Murphy)
4-14	-/b Stellographiers transcerpt

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CRIMINA	L DOCKET	3			
DATE		PROCEEDINGS			
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

pusley 5.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN,

Defendants.

Cr. No. 7 4 CR 52 511 (T. 18, U.S.C., \$2113(a), \$2113(d), \$2 and \$371) December 30,1974

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

#### COUNT ONE

On or about the 9th day of May, 1974, within the

Eastern District of New York, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY
and ROBERT WIDMAN knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence,
and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of
employees of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue,
Jamaica, New York, approximately Seventy Three Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety Four Dollars (\$73,594.00), in United States
currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said bank, the deposits of which
bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a)
and 2.)

#### COUNT TWO

On er about the 9th day of May, 1974, within the Bastern District of New York, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, approximately Seventy Three Thousand Five Hundred Kinety Four Dollars (\$73,594.09), in United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said bank, the deposits of

which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and in commission of this act and offense the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN did assault and place in jeopardy the lives of the said bank employees, as well as the lives of other persons present by the use of a dangerous weapon. (Title 19, United States Code, Sections 2113(d) and 2.)

### COUNT THREE

On or about and between the 6th day of May 1974 and the 9th day of May 1974, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN did knowingly and wilfully conspire to commit an offense against the United States, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(a) and Section 2113(d) by conspiring to take by force and violence a sum of money which was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

In furtherance of the said unlawful conspiracy and for the purpose of effecting the objectives thereof, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDHAN, within the Eastern District of New York, committed the following

### OVERT ACTS

(1) On or about May 6th, 7th and 8th, 1974, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN positioned themselves within the vicinity of said bank at a place where the daily functions of the bank could be observed.

(2) On or about the 9th day of May 1974, the defendants THOMAS B. MURPHY and ROBERT WIDMAN entered the Chase Manhattan Bank at 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, and had in their possession dangerous weapons.

A TRUE BILL.

FOREMAN.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

and I will then charge you on the law.

(A 5-minute recess was taken and at 11:35 a.m. the trial resumed.)

THE COURT: All right, seat the jury.

(The jury took it's place in the jury box.)

Charge by the Honorable Jacob Mishler,
Chief United States District Judge, to the jury.

THE COURT: Madam Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

You heard all the evidence in the case, the lawyers have argued the evidence to you and I have the obligation of charging you on the relevant law.

A trial is an adversary proceeding in this country. The lawyers have the obligation of producing the evidence, developing the evidence during the trial for the jury to see. The lawyers are advocates, they are protagonists, they are partial. They can best do their job when they perform with the zeal that requires an understanding of each client's position. The theory is that when lawyers have comparable abilities and contest an issue of fact — that is where one takes one side and the other takes the other side — that the evidence will be developed before the jury to see.

The jury and the Court, on the other hand, are

impartial and objective. We both must look at this as judges, calmly, without any sympathy, without any bias, without any prejudice.

The jury is the sole judge of the facts, the jury is as complete a judge in this case as the Court is the judge of the law. The effectiveness of a jury trial depends on the willingness of the jury to look at the facts and seek the truth, and then having found from the contested issues what happened, which is what we mean when we say that the jury is the judge of the facts, you then apply the law as I charge you.

I have no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of either of the defendants, as to either of these charges. I leave that solely to you and that is as it should be. On the other hand, you must as jurors accept the law as I charge it, even though you disagree with the charge as I give it or any part of it. You have the obligation of accepting it as the law of the case and applying it to the facts as you find them.

against Thomas Murphy and Robert Widman. As I will charge you later, there are 3 counts in the indictment, and as I indicated to you before, the first 2 counts

represent a lesser and graver charge of the same violation while the third count is the conspiracy count. But each defendant must be judged separately, individually on each count. It is as if you had 4 or 6 trials, depending on how you look at it, that is if you think if the first 2 counts as 1 count. The defendants have pleaded not guilty to all the counts in the indictment. 8

> In giving you my charge, I may say "defendant, I may say "defendants," I may use "the accused," in the singular or in the plural and apply it to both but it all means the same. I may say "defendant," meaning both defendants or I may use "the accused," or use "defendants." If I intend that the charge applies solely to one defendant, I will indicate it.

The defendants are presumed to be innocent . The presumption of innocence is a strong presumption and time-honored in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It means that the defendants start off with a clean slate, you must conclude that they are innocent of the charges in the indictment and the conclusion remains throughout the trial and throughout your deliberations, it remains, it prevails unless overcome by proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. other words, to put the obligation of the jury and the

24

obligation of the Government in it's proper perspective, you think of this as not a determination of whether the defendant is innocent or the defendants are innocent, but rather whether the Government has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Continued next page.)

THE COURT: (Addressing the jury.)

What is proof, what is a reasonable doubt/
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which a reasonable
person has after carefully weighing all of the
evidence in the case.

Now, we understand that it is normal for individuals to be disinclined to return a verdict of of guilty, even where guilt is proven, so the kind of a doubt that might arise from the disinclination to find a defendant guilty who has been proven guilty is not the kind of doubt we are talking about. We are not talking about a vague or speculative doubt or one based on emotion.

The kind of doubt we are talking about is one that is present in the record, in the evidence in the case.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt -- I am sorry,

I would rather continue defining a reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt you might

have after dealing with all the evidence and would

hesitate to act upon if it concerned a matter of

importance to you.

proof beyond a reasonable doubt is therefore proof of such a convincing nature that you would be

willing to rely and act upon unhesitatingly in the most important of your own affairs.

The Government's burden is not to prove that all the evidence or every bit of evidence that was offered before you is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government's burden, as heavy as it is, is not to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all doubt, the Government's burden is to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all doubt, the Government's burden is to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

When we talk about proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I will charge you on the elements of each crime charged and that the Government must prove all the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt may arise from the failure of the Government to produce evidence. The defendants do not have to prove their innocence, the defendants do not have to offer any proof whatsoever; on the contrary, they are presumed to be innocent and they may rely on the failure of the Government to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now in this case the defendant Widman has offered as evidence, good general reputation for honesty and as a law abiding citizen. The jury

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should consider that evidence along with all the other evidence in the case.

honesty or as a law abiding citizen have not been discussed or that those traits of the defendant's character have not been questioned may be sufficient to warrant an inference of good reputation as to those traits or character, and evidence of a defendant's reputation consistent with those traits of character which are ordinarily involved in the commission of a crime charged may give rise to a reasonable doubt since the jury may think it improbable that a person possessing those traits of character would commit the crime charged.

Now what is evidence:

evidence is the method the law uses to prove or disprove a disputed fact. Evidence is generally classified as direct evidence or indirect evidence, and indirect evidence is usually called circumstantial evidence.

Direct evidence is the testimony of witnesses,

of what a witness saw or the witness said. Circum
stantial evidence, on the other hand, is the method that

the jury uses for determining a disputed fact

from an established fact.

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Drawing a fair and reasonable inference based on good common sense and experience:

In your search for the truth, you will find the most valuable tools to be your own good common sense experience. We have all lived sometime on this earth and we have learned something from just living here through our common experience. Do not be reluctant to use your good common sense and experience and say to yourselves, "Well, does this make sense?" It is a good question which you might ask repeatedly throughout your deliberations.

I would like to use an example of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, it will be helpful in explaining the definition I just gave

Let us assume that my courtroom deputy, Mr.

Adler, and myself were standing on the street corner

one day and at that street corner there was a stop

sign, he with his back to the roadway and the stop
sign and I having the entire sign and roadway in

plain view.

Let us assume that while speaking with him I noticed a motor vehicle that I later identified as a

a woman.

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1975 white Cadillac speeding along at 65 miles an hour, pass the stop sign without stopping and strike

If I were called to testify in a personal injury action where the woman was suing the driver of the car, I would be able to testify to the fact that that motor vehicle passed a stop sign without stopping.

If you were sitting here as a jury in this case, plaintiff claiming that the defendant passed a stop sign without stopping and the defendant claiming that he stopped at the stop sign and proceeded, you would recognize that the disputed fact was whether or not the defendant passed a stop sign without stopping.

If I were called to testify, it is clear that I could give direct testimony on that fact at issue.

Now Mr. Adler did not have the stop sign in view but he nevertheless could testify concerning the circumstances from which you might reasonably draw the inference that that motor vehicle passed the stop sign without stopping.

He might say that he was talking with me and as he glanced to his right the 1975 Cadillac came

within his view, within his peripheral vision, and he noticed the car proceeding at about 65 miles an hour, that he lost sight of the car and that it was about 150 feet and two or three seconds later when he looked to the left and saw the same motor vehicle at the same rate of speed and it knocked down the plaintiff.

vehicle passed the stop sign without stopping. From the circumstances I think you will agree with me that it would be reasonable for you to infer that that motor vehicle passed the stop sign without stopping, that it was travelling 65 miles an hour and that 150 feet later or two or three seconds later it was travelling about the same speed so it couldn't have stopped and then proceeded. At least that is the fair and reasonable inference.

That is the difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.

The law does not hold that one type of evidence is of better quality than the other. At times direct evidence is of a better quality and at times of circumstantial evidence is/a better quality.

The law requires the Government to prove the

guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt on both the direct and the circumstantial evidence.

(Contd on next page.)

THE COURT: (Continuing) I used the term "inference" and I used the term "presumption."

An inference is a conclusion which reason and common sense leads the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.

An example of that, of course, is the inference which a jury draws in determining facts through circumstantial evidence. A presumption, on the other hand, is a conclusion which the law requres the jury to make, and it continues only as long as it is not overcome or outweighed by evidence in the case to the contrary by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The example of that, of course, is the presumption of innocence.

What is evidence in the case? It is the sworn testimony of the witnesses regardless of who may have called them; it is the exhibits that were actually received in evidence regardless of who produced them; facts which may have been judicially noticed by the Court -- I am not sure that I judicially noticed any facts, but if I said, for example, that May 9, 1974, was the Thursday of the week or that May 13, 1974, was the Monday of the week, then I judicially noticed the fact and it becomes a part of the record.

I think it is helpful to understand what is not a part of the record and what you may not consider

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Charge of the Court

in arriving at your determination:

First, statements or arguments made by counsel in both the openings and the summat ons. Counsel pointed out to you the purpose; both are very helpful tools or guides for the jury, but they are not evidence. The openings were designed to alert you to the positions of the parties. The summations or arguments made by the lawyers focused on what they believed the crucial issue in the case was: they pointed out the evidence relating to whether the accused were at the bank and in the bank on the morning of May 9, 1974. Of course, the defendants argued theories of exculpability, which in effect say the Government failed to prove the guilt of my client by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The argument of the Government was, in effect, that the Government has proved the guilt of both defendants by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The arguments again are intended to guide you as to what the lawyers think is the important evidence and what are the important issues and to help you arrive at a fair determination.

They are not intended

or misinterpreted the evidence, then you use your own recollection as to what the evidence was. And of course we have a transcript of the testimony and I will tell you later that if there is a question in your mind as to what anyone said, it will be read back to you.

I don't recall making any remarks or statements, but if I did of course that is not evidence. I have no standing in this trial except as the judge of the law, and if I did make any statements, just disregard them. If I asked a question, and I recall asking just one or two, don't attach any special significance to the question because I asked it, if I asked the question it was only because I thought an area of inquiry was a little confusing, confusing to me, it may not have been confusing to you, but I assumed it was, so I asked a question or two in the hope that it might clarify the issue.

When that is stricken from the record, you cannot consider that matter. As it is physically stricken from the reporter's notes, so it should be figuratively stricken from your minds and your memory.

At times, objection was taken to questions and

objections were sustained. You may not speculate on what the answer may have been had the witness been allowed to answer. On the same theory, if the witness did not answer, then the evidence did not get into the record, so you cannot speculate on what he might have said if I had overruled the objection and there had been an answer to the question.

You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, which means the believability of their testimony and the weight their testimony deserves.

Scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under which each witness testified and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief.

Now worthy of belief doesn't mean alone whether you believe the witness was trying to tell the truth or trying to avoid the truth or lie. It was pointed out by counsel that he felt the bank employees who testified did so in good faith, and I assume what he meant is that they were attempting to tell the truth.

It doesn't always mean that you are to only decide whether the witness is telling the truth or attempting to lie because one of the problems that

we will come to later is the witness' own ability
to observe or to have observed the perpetrators of
the crime, so there are other factors, of course,
which you take into consideration. When you use
your good common sense you will think of others, but
I suggest that you can consider the intelligence of
the witness, take into the consideration the motive
and state of mind of the witness, why is the witness
testifying, does the witness have a reason which might
indicate a reason to lie or to tell the truth.

The state of mind of the witness: take into consideration the demeanor of the witness on the witness stand and the manner in which the witness answers the questions: Did the witness answer the questions fully, did the witness tell everything that he knew in answer to that question, was the witness able to tell or to answer the question from what that witness saw and observed.

Take into consideration the relationship that
each witness might bear to either side of the case.
You must consider that Mr. Carbone is a Special Agent
of the FBI and that he might have an interest in
seeing a successful prosecution. On the other hand,
the relationship of the mother and brother of the

defendant is quite obvious, so take that into consideration.

Take into consideration the manner in which
a witness might be affected by the verdict, take
into consideration the extent to which if at all the
witness is corroborated or contradicted by other evidence
in the case.

The Government offered testimony through Mr.

Carbone that the defendant Robert Widman at the time or soon after his arrest made certain statements.

As I recall them -- and incidentally when I say as I recall the testimony, don't take it for the Gospel truth, you use your own recollection -- this, as I recall it -- and I don't claim that my memory is any better than yours, if I took a statistical guess I would say that at least half of the jurors had a better memory than I have --

(Continued next page.)

Mr. Widman said something to the effect that he didn't know Mr. Murphy; and that he said this after he had been shown a picture of Mr. Murphy; he said that he had never been in a 1965 blue Cadillac; he said that he had never used the alias of Robert Hoffman; and he said he hadn't ever been to Honolulu, as I recall it, within the last year.

ments, knowingly made upon being informed that a crime had been committed or upon being confronted with a criminal charge, may be considered by the jury in the light of all the other evidence in the case in determining guilt or innocence. When a defendant voluntarily and intentionally offers an explanation or makes some statement tending to show his innocence, and this explanation or statement is later shown to be false, the jury may consider whether this circumstantial evidence points to a consciousness of guilt.

In other words, whether you may draw an inference from the false statements, exculpatory statements, which tends to show his innocence, his non-involvement in the crime charged, if that is later shown to be

false, then the jury may infer from those exculpatory statements later shown to be false, and all the other evidence in the case, the jury may infer that there was a consciousness of guilt that he was aware that he was guilty of the crime charged.

Now, the reason that you may draw the inference is because the law recognizes that it is
reasonable to infer that an innocent person does
not usually find it necessary to invent or fabricate
an explanation or statement tending to establish his
innocence.

Now, whether or not evidence as to a defendant's voluntary statements or statement points to consciousness of guilt -- and the significance to be attached to any such evidence on that is exclusively within the province of the jury.

Now, the statement must be knowingly and voluntarily made, not just an accidental statement. The
defendant must be shown by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was aware of what he was saying; must
be shown that it was voluntarily made; that he intended to make that statement; and the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that before he made
that statement he was advised of his constitutional

rights and he was advised of the consequences if he made the statement. In other words, that he had the right to remain silent; that he didn't have to say anything if he didn't want to, but if he did, it could be used against him; he had a right to counsel; and if he couldn't afford counsel, the Court would appoint counsel. If the Government hasn't proved all that beyond a reasonable doubt, then disregard the exculpatory statements.

The indictment, which I will read to you, is based on Federal statutory law. The book I am holding is Crime and Criminal Procedure and it contains statutes passed by the Congress. It is the Congress that defines what a crime is.

The indictment is based on certain sections of Title 18. And the reference to it is a reference to the codification of the statutes under Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

I am going to read the indictment first and then
the statute. I am going to read Count 2 first because
Count 2 is the graver charge, the more serious charge.
It has one element in it that Count 1 does not have.

Count 2 charges as follows:

On or about the 9th day of May, 1974, within

Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman, knowingly and willfully, by force, violence and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, approximately \$73,594, United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said bank, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and in commission of this act and offense the defendants

Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman --

Now, this is the additional element that you won't find in Count 1.

-- and in commission of this act and offense
the defendants Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman did
assault and place in jeopardy the lives of the said
bank employees as well as the lives of other persons
present by the use of a dangerous weapon.

That's in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2113(d).

Now, remember the Subsection (d).

Now, I will read Count 1 to you. And you will find that it agrees exactly the same, except it leaves

out the last element, when I stopped and hesitated and said, and in the commission of this act -- that's not in the first Count.

It reads as follows:

On or about the 9th day of May, 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants
Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman, knowingly and willfully, by force, violence, and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, approximately \$73,594, in United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of said bank, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(a)

Now, 2113(a) of Title 18 says, whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes from the person or presence of another, any property or money belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or possession, of any bank, commits a violation of that section.

So you notice the phraseology is very much like the phraseology in the indictment.

That's Section (a) of 2113.

Now, (d) says, whoever, in committing any offense defined in Subsection (a) assaults any person or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, commits a violation of Subsection (d).

So that's what makes it the more serious crime, the graver crime.

Now, I indicated to you that bank robbery is not a Federal crime unless the money that is in the care, custody, control and management of the bank, the bank's money is insured by a Federal agency or corporation. In this case, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. That is also in the Section, Subsection (f).

It says, as used in this section, the term

bank means -- I will skip a lot of the other material

-- any bank the deposits of which are insured by the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

In considering whether the Government has proved the indictment of a defendant by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I am going to ask you to first consider Count 2, the graver crime. The Government must prove all the following elements by proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.

One. That on May 9, 1974, the accused took approximately \$73,594 from the person or presence of the tellers or other employees of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, which money belonged to, or was in the care, the custody, control and management of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

That's one element.

Two. The act of taking such money by force and violence, or by means of intimidation.

Three. Doing such act knowingly and willfully.

Four, that the Chase Manhattan was a banking institution, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the time of the offense alleged.

And five, the act or acts of assaulting or putting in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device while engaged in stealing such money from the bank as charged.

Now, the Government must prove all those essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the accused guilty of Count 2, don't consider Count 1. Because if you've found the accused

guilty of Count 2, you have already found him guilty of Count 1. But if you haven't found the accused guilty of Count 2, if you find the accused not guilty of Count 2, then you go to Count 1. And the Government there must prove all the essential elements of the Count charged except for the last one. And that essential element is the act or acts of assaulting or putting in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device while engaged in stealing such money from the bank.

Now, as I say, an act is done knowingly when the person doing it is aware of what he is doing.

It is a voluntary and intentional act, not one by mistake or accident. And the statute and the charge in the indictment say the act must be done willfully. And an act is done willfully if done voluntarily and with specific intent to violate the law, the specific intent to do that which the law forbids.

Now, the Government must prove that the money was taken by either force and violence, which means physical force. And violence, I don't think I have to explain any further. Or through means of intimidation. When we talk about taking by intimidation, it means the willful taking of the money by putting the

employee in fear of bodily harm.

Now, the fear we are talking about is not just fear that someone might have because of some temperamental timidity, but the fear that is generated from what the perpetrators said and did, and a fear that he knowingly intends to convey to the employees of the bank.

count 2, when we talk about the element of either assaulting a person, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused while committing the bank robbery assaulted or put in jeopardy the life of an employee of the bank at the time.

Now, an assault is a willful attempt to, a threat to inflict physical harm coupled with an apparent present ability to do so, or any intentional display of force as would give the victim reason to fear and expect immediately bodily harm. When we talk about putting a life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, we mean that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the employee or employees were exposed to death, and that the device or weapon used was capable of inflicting death — capable of killing an employee of the bank.

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I have charged you on all the essential elements of the crime charged. And, of course, the Government must prove that the accused was the perpetrator; in effect, prove that the accused was in the bank, robbing the bank on May 9, 1974, at or about 8:30 or whatever you find the time to be.

The lawyers indicated that that was a critical issue in this case.

Now, I want to make sure that the issue is properly phrased. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused who you find to be guilty of the crime was present at the bank. And the Government must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government doesn't necessarily have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any particular witness identified the accused or either of them as the person present in the bank. Identification testimony is some of the proof that the Government offered .-- the main proof that the Government offered -- and I am talking about identification testimony given by all of the bank witnesses -- but there is other proof in the case. When I say there is other proof in the case, I am not indicating that you should credit or believe it. I just want to point

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it out to you.

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Turning to identification testimony:

The evidence in the case includes testimony by Alice DeChiara, Lottie Hoggard, and Joseph Leader, on a prior photographic identification from a spread or spreads of photographs. There has been in-court identification of Mr. Widman by -- and I shouldn't say identification. I should say there is some testimony given by Christina Jonke, Marie Daly, Barbara Ransom and Plenio Medina in Court where the witnesses pointed out with varying degrees of certainty that the defendant Robert Widman was the taller of the bank robbers.

There has also been prior photographic identification by Mrs. Jonke and Mrs. Daly of the defendant Robert Widman as the taller bank robber.

There has been testimony -- and I can't recall the witness that identified the defendant Robert Widman in the lineup. There is also testimony of the witnesses -- and I don't recall who -- of the failure to identify the defendant Murphy in the lineup. And I think there is some testimony of one or more witnesses that failed to identify the defendant Widman in the lineup.

with caution and scrutinized with great care.

Identification testimony is an expression or belief
by the witness of what the witness saw at the time
of the crime. The question that should be uppermost
in your mind is whether when the witness selected a
picture from a spread, selected an individual from a
lineup, or made an in-court identification, whether
that was the impression that remained in her mind or
his mind from what he or she saw at the time --

-- as far as the bank employees are concerned,
at the time of the robbery; as far as Mr. Medina is
concerned, at the time he walked along the street and
said he saw an individual in the blue 1965 Cadillac.
And that such testimony is not given from any suggestion
either through the manner the spread was offered or
the lineup was made.

In appraising the identification testimony of the witness, you should consider the following:

One, whether the witness had the capacity and the adequate opportunity to observe the perpetrator or perpetrators.

This will depend on all the circumstances at the time the witness observed the perpetrator or

offenders.

short a time the witness saw the offender, or how far or how close the witness was to the offender, the lighting conditions at the time, the position from which the witnesses viewed the offender, the emotional state of the witness at the time. Would someone be inclined to be confused, or would it sharpen the witness's view and recollection of the offender.

Take into consideration the strength of the identification. Was the witness absolutely sure or absolutely certain, reasonably certain, or in such a serious doubt as to the resemblance to the offender that the identification would be worthless.

Scrutinize all the circumstances under which the identification was made prior to trial.

of photographs, take into consideration when the identification was made, how soon after the crime.

Take into consideration whether the witness selected a photograph from a spread.

In this case, the testimony is that it was a spread of 6. Well, look at the photographs. Was it

a fair sampling? Is it the kind of selection someone would make from all these photographs if the impression came at the time of the robbery? Were the photographs similar enough so that someone who hadn't seen the perpetrator, or no impression was made, would have picked the defendant as the perpetrator?

(Continued next page.)

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was it the type of spread that in all liklihood only someone who would have seen the perpetrator
would have picked the defendant as the perpetrator?
The lineup identification procedure, you determine
whether it was fair. Were the men selected similar
enough so that someone who had seen the perpetrator
at the time of the crime would have picked the
perpetrator out?

was it the kind that was unfair so that anyone without even having seen the perpetrator, would
have picked that individual out?

than one witness may have selected a defendant as a perpetrator, does not necessarily mean that if two picked the defendant out as the perpetrator of the crime that two is necessarily any greater than one.

Use your good common sense in determining for yourself, based on how the witnesses testified, as to whether collectively all of the testimony brings you to the conclusion that the Government proved that the accused was present at the bank. Take into consideration the failure of the witnesses to make a selection.

The Government's burden is to prove that the accused was present in the bank and committed the

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robbery. In addition to identification testimony, you may consider all the other evidence in the case, all the testimony concerning a 1965 Cadillac in the area of the bank for three days, prior to the robbery. In itself is not to say being at the bank is any proof. I say you do not segregate testimony and say, "Does this bit of testimony prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants perpetrated the crime?" You must examine the entire evidence in the case to make the determination. If you believe the statements by the defendant Widman was knowingly and voluntarily made under the charge I gave you, of course, you consider that testimony as part of the evidence in the case and based upon all the evidence in the case you determine whether the Government has proved the guilt of the defendant by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, the other count in the indictment, Count 3 reads as follows:

"On or about and between the 6th day of Tay

1974 and the 9th day of May 1974, both dates being

approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District

of New York, the defendants Thomas B. Murphy and

Robert Widman did knowingly and wilfully conspire

in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Saction 2113 (a) and Section 2113 (d) by conspiring to take by force and violence a sum of money which was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

"In furtherance of the said unlawful conspiracy and for the purpose of effecting the objectives thereof, the defendants Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman, within the Eastern District of New York committed the following overt acts:

- "1. On or about May 6th, 7th, and 8th, 1974, the defendants Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman positioned themselves within the vicinity of said bank at a place where the daily functions of the bank could be observed.
- defendants Thomas B. Murphy and Robert Widman entered the Chase Manhattan Bank at 190-02 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica, New York and had in their possession dangerous weapons."

This is called the conspiracy count and comes under a different section of Title 18. Section 371 defines the crime of conspiracy as follows:

"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States or to defraud the United States or any agencies thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, the section is violated."

You see, on the one hand the statute is specific. It refers to bank robbery. That is what we call a substantive crime. On the other hand the conspiracy statute is a general statute. It does not talk about completing a crime. What it prohibits and what it defines as a crime is the understanding and the agreement to commit a crime by two or more persons and the committing of an overt act in furtherance of the purposes of that conspiracy. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose. A conspiracy is a kind of partnership in criminal purposes. It is an understanding or agreement to get together in this case to rob the Chase Manhattan Bank at 190-02 Jamaica Avenue. The Government charges — and again I do not

mean to say that I find that the Government has
established its claim, nor do I indicate in any way
that the testimony is to be believed because that is
a question solely for you. The Government's position
is that the planning of this bank robbery started on
or about May 6th. That is the preparation for it,
the casing of the bank, and that the robbery itself
was an overt act. It is not really the robbery, it is
that they positioned themselves on May 6th, 7th and
8th, 1974 in the vicinity of the bank and the claim
is that they did that for the purpose of carrying
out their deal, their understanding to commit bank
robbery and the other overt act claimed is that they
entered the bank in possession of dangerous weapons.

Even though the Government claims they completed
the purpose of the agreement, the conspiracy, the
Government does not have to prove that the bank robbery
actually was completed in order to prove conspiracy
because again I say it is the unlawful agreement that
is the crime and not the bank robbery. That is why
we call it the "conspiracy charge."

In order for the Government to prove the charge in Count 3, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy described in the

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indictment was wilfully formed and was existing at or about the time alleged, that it was existing for the purpose alleged, to whit, to rob the bank.

member of the conspiracy. In every crime you have to have criminal intent and that is what wilfully means. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they entered into this deal or understanding among themselves or between themselves -- between Murphy and Widman -- voluntarily, intentionally and for the purpose of robbing the bank.

Three, that one of the conspirators thereafter knowingly committed one of the overt acts charged in the indictment on or about the time alleged.

I just went over the two overt acts alleged.

The Government must prove that one of those overt

acts were committed, and;

Four, that such overt act was knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

In this case it means that the Government prove that whoever committed the overt act -- here the Government claims that both did -- committed the overt act aware of what he was doing and knowing it

was done in order to accomplish the purpose, to wit;, to rob the bank.

Now, I will shortly excuse you from the courtroom to deliberate on the matter, but I want to remind you that your verdict must be unanimous. Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself.

Again, you have the obligation of exchanging your views concerning the evidence with the other members of the jury. You violate your obligation if you abandon your duty and just go along without talking about the evidence, without making up your own mind by leaving it to the other jurors.

obstinately refuse to discuss your views with the other jurors and if you take the position that you have arrived at a verdict and you won't budge and you refuse to discuss the evidence. There is nothing wrong with changing your opinion after you have arrived at a tentative opinion if you do so fairly and honestly and if you can do so based on what you understand the evidence to be. You may give up a judgment or determination tentatively arrived at if you can do so without doing violence to your judgment.

If you have any communication with the Court,

all communications will come through your foreman.

If you want to hear any testimony try to identify it,
try to tell us what testimony you would like. Give
the name of the witness if you can, the subject matter
if you can. When we have found the testimony you want,
I will call you into the courtroom and I will read it
to you. Everything that we do must be done in open
court and be recorded.

During the deliberations, do not tell me how you stand at any time during your deliberations. I am not interested in knowing whether it is six to six, eight to four, ten to two or eleven to one. I am interested in knowing when you have arrived at a unanimous verdict and all you need say to me: "We have arrived at a verdict."

Do not tell me what the verdict is. AT that time I will call you into the courtroom and I will ask the Foreman to stand and in effect I will say:

"Madam Foreman, how do you find the defendant, Thomas B. Murphy, as to Count 2?"

Again, I will remind you I will ask you about Count 2 first. If you say "Not guilty" I will say then:

"How do you find as to Count 1?"

Then you will render the verdict. If you say

"Not Guilty" I will not ask you further about Count 1.

Then I will go to Count 3 and I will ask you:

"How do you find the defendant, Thomas B.
Murphy, as to Count 3?"

You will render your verdict guilty or not guilty. I will ask you the same about Robert Widman and then I will ask Juror No. 2 whether she heard the verdict as rendered by the Foreman and if she says "Yes" I will say:

"Is that your verdict?" And, I will go to

Juror No. 3 and ask whether that is your verdict and
so on until I call on Juror No. 12 to render her

verdict. If all the jurors agree in open court to

the verdict, then for the first time it becomes the

verdict of this case.

Now, I ask you to retire from the courtroom.

Do not start your deliberations yet. I want to talk

to the lawyers for a few moments and then I will

call you back into the courtroom.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

THE COURT: Ms. O'Brien, any exceptions to the charge?

MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, there was one thing.

Your Honor had mentioned that there was a nonidentification of Mr. Widman in a lineup. There was no testimony to that effect.

THE COURT: Did I say as to him or did I say
I was not sure?

MS. O'BRIEN: You did express some degree of uncertainty.

THE COURT: Do you agree there was no testimony in the record that a witness failed to identify

Mr. Widman?

MS. SEYBERT: Whether there is testimony or not, whether a new witness failed to identify Mr. Widman or not, there were witnesses present at the lineup that did not identify Mr. Widman.

MS. SEYBERT: It is not in the record, but to indicate that everyone identified Mr. Widman at a lineup would be against the interest of justice.

THE COURT: What are the interest of justice?

I do not understand the interest of justice in that regard. What are they, to go outside the record?

MS. SEYBERT: No, your Honor. To indicate to the jurors so that everyone selected Mr. Widman is just not the truth.

MS. O'BRIEN: Everyone that testified here did

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select Mr. Widman.

Every witness that testified as to Widman's identification did identify Mr. Widman --

MR. BORG: May I make --

THE COURT: Anything else?

MS. O'BRIEN: That's all, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to the charge or exceptions to the charge, Mr. Borg?

MR. BORG: Yes, I do.

First of all, the lack of identification was by each of the witnesses who selected the photo.

They were the ones that did not identify Mr. Murphy.

MS. O'BRIEN: But the statement was made as to Mr. Widman.

THE COURT: I said I was not quite sure.

MR. BORG: I object to your Honor's charge where
you state that the Government does not have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is identified
as the perpetrator.

THE COURT: Excuse me?

MR. BORG: I may be wrong in the wording, but I recall your Honor saying that the Government does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is identified as the perpetrator.

MS. SEYBERT: I would join in that exception.

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THE COURT: I said I would reframe the issues.

Either you or Ms. Seybert went to the jury and said the Government must prove through identification testimony that the accused was in the bank and I said that is not the issue, the issue was whether the accused was in the bank, that identification testimony is some of the evidence.

I wrote that out because of what Ms. Seybert said. She went to the jury and said that the only thing here is the identification testimony and that just is not true. That is why I said what I said.

MS. SEYBERT: I do not think I face it in that manner.

MR. BORG: I stated that the Government mu t prove in fact that Murphy was in the bank that day.

THE COURT: Well, you may have said that too.

MR. BORG: I did say that.

THE COURT: I say you may have said that too, but either you or Ms. Seybert or both of you went to the jury and said, in effect, the only testimony in this case to prove that these defendants were in the bank were identification testimony. Do you remember saying that?

MS. SEYBERT: I said there is no other proof -independent proof that my client was in the bank --

THE COURT: Exactly.

MS. SEYBERT: -- other than identification.

THE COURT: That is just not true.

MR. BORG: Would your Honor correct --

about? You agree that the robbery was committed.

What's the testimony about them being at the bank

for three days before? What is the testimony concerning

exculpatory statements? What is the testimony about

the trip to Hawaii and so forth? Don't you think that's

on that issue?

MS. SEYBERT: Doesn't provide the Government with the case that this particular defendant was in the bank at the time on that day.

THE COURT: I know the case can be better,
but the perpetrator was not considered enough to leave
it. All you are saying is that the case could be a
better case.

MS. SEYBERT: Yes.

THE COURT: That avoids the argument.

MR. BORG: Would you Honor correct where your Honor stated --

THE COURT: Go back and read back what I said.

Anything else that you have, Mr. Borg?

MR. BORG: No further objections.

THE COURT: Any exception to the charge?
MS. SEYBERT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: The only question is whether I will charge any further on Widman --

MR. BORG: What about Murphy, regarding the identification of the accused in the bank as being the perpetrator?

THE COURT: What about it?

MR. BORG: I was excepting to your Honor's statement --

THE COURT: We are waiting for Mr. Barbella to come up and read what I said.

MR. BORG: That was the lineup. This is her argument that your Honor stated about non-identification at a lineup.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BORG: Your Honor either said Widman when he meant Murphy --

THE COURT: I said that there was a failure to identify Murphy. I said there might have been a failure to identify Widman. That is what the Government is complaining about. We will get that from Mr. Barbella and we will hear it again.

(Mr. Barbella entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I want to know whether I said it

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was not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendants were the perpetrators of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Will you please go to that part and find it. I think I started by saying the real issue in the case is whether the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused or the defendants were in the bank at the time of the bank robbery. Take it from there and read everything.

(Charge read.)

THE COURT: After that I think I said "Identification testimony was not the only testimony in the case to prove that" and I said that only because Ms. Seybert went to the jury and said that that was the only testimony in the case.

The case from which I got the identification charge was United States against Holly. I do not have the citation, except it was in the United States Attorney's Bulletin. It was a Fourth Circuit case decided on May 20th, 1974.

Ms. Seybert is shaking her head. Is that what you are objecting to?

MR. BARBELLA: "The Government does not necessarily have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any particular witness identified the accused or either of them as the person present in the bank."

(Continued on next page)

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THE COURT: What did you say is wrong with that?

MS. SEYBERT: If they do not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this man robbed the bank, then what is this all about?

THE COURT: Read it once more, maybe I did not understand it.

MR. BARBELLA: "The Government does not necessarily have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any particular witness identified the accused or either of them as the person present in the bank."

THE COURT: That a particular witness.

All right, I will clarify that and say the Government does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identifying witness is absolutely certain as to the identification.

MR. BORG: Would your Honor add that they must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they must be in fact in the bank?

again, as many times as you want it, because that is the issue. I want them to understand that the issue isnot whether a witness can positively prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the man. I want to make sure that the jury understands that prior

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identification testimony or in Court identification testimony is the only proof that these defendants were in the bank.

MR. BORG: Could your Honor at least leave them with the thought that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses are certain -- they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, not the witnesses to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. I think that is the language.

THE COURT: No, I will not do that because it just is not true. Identification of these defendants as being in the bank is a little confusing. That is why I did not use "Identify them as the perpetrators." That issue must be sustained by the Government, but that's a lot different than saying that the only proof that these defendants were in the bank was the identification testimony. If this were all the testimony that the Government had, I would charge them that the Government has only the identifying testimony and that they must believe all that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. I do not even like that phraseology. The issue must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not believe each witness beyond a reasonable doubt. That's really saying to the jury: "You must believe each witness separately and you must

believe that they positively identified the accused as the perpetrator, otherwise you must bring in a verdict of not guilty." It is just not the law.

Give me that sentence again.

(Charge read.)

MR. BORG: I think I had outlined a charge in my request -- I'd like to quote from it, but I do not have my copy of it.

(Document handed to counsel.)

MR. BORG: Your Honor, may I read from my own submission?

emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecution extends to every element of the crime charged and this specifically includes the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of their identification, as to the ability to identify the defendants at all, you must find the defendant not guilty.

That is adopted from United States vs. Telsare.

I think that covers your Honor's statement about identifying the defendants in the bank.

That specifically states reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification.

THE COURT: I will take this statement from Holly and it might satisfy both:

One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement.

That is the thought that I tried to get across.

However, you the jury must be satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification
of the defendant before you may convict him. If
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant was a person who committed the crime, you
must find the defendant not guilty.

MS. O'BRIEN: Could you also add including the identification and the non-identification testimony?

THE COURT: I have already charged that.

MS. O'BRIEN: Including all the evidence?

MR. BORG: That specifically goes to identifica-

tion.

THE COURT: No, I am not going to recharge.

Do you want me to tell them to forget the

statement that I made:

"The Government doesn't necessarily have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any particular witness identified the accused or either them as a person present in the bank."

MR. BORG: Yes, I would ask your Honor to correct that and read what your Honor read from Holly.

MS. O'BRIEN: I would request that you include in this portion of the charge the statement that they do not have to find that each identifying witness found -- that --

THE COURT: It says that. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement.

MS. O"BRIEN: And that other elements of the identification issue can be included, aside from the in court identification, including the evidence of the cars and the evidence of the trips. You don't have to name the cars and the trips, but the other non-identifying testimony.

MR. BORG: My sole exception was to that statement and phrase.

THE COURT: The longer we talk, the more involved it gets. I never cut anybody off. If I thought there was anything to what Ms. O'Brien was

saying, I would listen to her.

I am going to paraphrase Holly and I am not going to again tell them that there is other evidence in the case. I think I have told them that.

MS. O'BRIEN: What about the statement on Mr. Widman?

THE COURT: I am not going to do anything about it. I think it was so indefinite that they'd recognize it. I have faith in the jury. They will understand the case.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: I said the Government does not necessarily have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any particular witness identifies the accused or either of them as the person present in the bank.

Now, that language is a little clumsy and might be misinterpreted. I will ask you to disregard that, and instead again I remind you that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was present in the bank on May 9th, 1974 and was the robber or with the robber at that time.

The Government has the burden of proving that beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness be entirely free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement -- his testimony concerning

or at a lineup or at a photographic spread.

However, you must be satisfied beyond a

the identification of the accused, either in court

However, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant as being in the bank. In coming to a determination on that contested issue, take all the evidence into consideration, not the identification testimony alone but all the evidence.

Now, if either lawyer wants me to excuse the jury for further argument on it, I will do it.

You, Ms. O'Brien?

MS. O'BRIEN: No.

MS. SEYBERT: No, your Honor.

MR. BORG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The jury may be excused.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

MR. BORG: Your Honor, the exception to that portion of your Honor's charge specifically dealt with the identification and the accuracy of it. Your Honor again included along with the other evidence.

I think that the point your Honor was trying to reach in the original charge to the jury was specifically the accuracy of the witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BORG: And I think again your Honor alluded

-- alluded to the other evidence and the other evidence
your Honor does not relate to the accuracy of the
identification -- it does not. The other evidence of
a trip to Hawaii goes to the entire case and I think
your Honor put in the other evidence with relating
to the --

THE COURT: You do not think the other evidence bears on the question as to whether these defendants robbed the bank?

MR. BORG: It goes to the entire case.

THE COURT: Yes, that is all I said.

You have your exception on the record.

Seat the jury.

MR. BORG: Once again the exception was not that it shouldn't go in as to whether they robbed the bank, but my exception is that your Honor put it in relating to the identification issue alone. That's the exception.

THE COURT: All right.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Alternate Juror No. 1, you are excused. You will find your lunch in my chambers.

Would you please take your coat and other possessions out of the jury room. You may not be in the jury room

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when the jury starts deliberating. Thank you.

(Alternate juror excused.)

THE COURT: Would the Clerk please swear in the Marshals?

(Marshals sworn.)

THE COURT: The jurors are excused for deliberation on the matter before them. Your lunch has arrived and that will probably be your first order of business. I will excuse the lawyers so they can have their lunch. I will ask them to return by 2:30. In the meantime, if you send in any notes you will not get a response until I have a chance to talk with the lawyers and it will be sometime after 2:30.

(The jurors are excused to begin their deliberations.)

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

MS. SEYBERT: May Mr. Widman have an opportunity to speak with his family if the Marshals will allow it?

THE COURT: I will leave that with the Marshals.

(Luncheon recess taken.)

THORNE AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER    September 1   Display		erica vs.	63 On		s District Court fo
JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER  JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER  AD NOTIFICAL  In the presence of the atturney for the government the defendant appeared in person on this date  JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER  AD 1975  AD	IL.			L-Basters watr	tot of New 10FB
In the presence of the attorney for the government the defendant appeared in person on this date  WITHOUT COUNSEL  WITHOUT COUNSEL  WITHOUT COUNSEL  WITHOUT COUNSEL  A journal of the count advised defendant of right to counted and asked whether defendant desired to have counted appointed by the count and the defendant thereupon waved assistance of counsel.  X j WITH COUNSEL  JOATHA, Seybert, Esq. of Legal Aid  (Name of counted)  WITHOUT COUNSEL  JOATHA, Seybert, Esq. of Legal Aid  (Name of counted)  WITHOUT COUNSEL  JOATHA, Seybert, Esq. of Legal Aid  (Name of counted)  There being a finding/verdict of  X JOULTY, and of counted and sked whether defendant desired the there is a factual basis for the plea,  WITHOUT COUNTER  FINDING A  JUDGMENT  There being a finding/verdict of  X JOULTY, and counted and inclusive, the defendant is discharged  In that on or about and between May 0 and Right, it is another, did know the large of the counter	FENDANT	ROBERT WIDMAN	N	DOCKET NO.	74 CR 817
In the presence of the attorney for the government the defendant appeared in person on this date  WITHOUT COUNSEL  WITHOUT COUNSEL  WITHOUNSEL  JOanna Seybert, Esq. of Legal Add  (Name of counsel)  GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea,  JOANNA Seybert, Esq. of Legal Add  (Name of counsel)  Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offenet(c) of Volating T18, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea, and the court being a finding/verdict of a guiltry. In counts 2 & 3  Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offenet(c) of Volating T18, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the offenet of the plea of the count and the vice may be and May 9, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the count and between May 6 and May 9, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the count of the count and between May 6 and May 9, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the count and between May 6 and May 9, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the count and between May 6 and May 9, 19/4, ERR both dates in the plea of the count and the count		UDGMENT AND	PROBATION/	COMMITME	NT ORDER A0-245 (6/74)
FINDING &  JOANNA, Seybert, Esq. of Legal Add  Not GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea, there is a factual basis for the plea,  JOCOMET There being a finding/verdict of  Land Court and Defendant is discharged  There being a finding/verdict of  Land Court and Defendant is discharged  There being a finding/verdict of  Land Court and Defendant is discharged  There being a finding/verdict of  Land Court and Defendant with another, did Attes being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did Attes being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did Attes being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did Attes being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did Attes being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another of employ- ingly and willfully conspire and diministry. The persons by the Use of a dangerous weapon  Proportion of the property of the person of the court and property of the person of the court and washed, or approximate on the court and washed, or approximate on the court and washed, or approximate on the court and washed, or appeared to the count and property of the person of the court and washed, or appeared to the count and the person of the court and washed, or appeared to the count and the person of the court and washed, or appeared to the count and the person of the court and washed, or appeared to the count and the person of the court and	- In	e defendant appeared in person on	this date —		4 4 1975
There being a finding/verdict of Country in counts 2 & 3  FINDING A JUDGMENT  There being a finding/verdict of Country in counts 2 & 3  Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of violating Tg18 1914. The both dates being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did knowledge of the offense(s) of violating Tg18 1914. The both dates being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another, did knowledge of the offense of the presence of employment and inclusive, the defendant with another, did knowledge of the constant of the country of	>	have	e counsel appointed by the co	sq. of Legal	A1d
Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of violating T918, 1914, the Social action of the theory of the Charge approximate and inclusive, the defendant, with another did knot being approximate and inclusive, the defendant, with another did knot being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another did knot being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another did knot being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with another did knot being approximate and inclusive, the defendant with a possible of the charge of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Jamaica, N.Y. approximate of employers of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Jamaica, N.Y. approximate of the control management of U.S. currency, which was in the care, custooty control management of musured by the fill. C. and deposite of the control management of the control mana		there is a factual basis for the	plea,		N'PTTIME !
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ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION  ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION  COUNT 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2) and 5 years on court 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2), said sentences to ruccourt 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2), said sentences to ruccourt 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2), said sentences to ruccourt 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2), said sentences to ruccourt 3 pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a) (2), said sentences to ruccourt and the second sentences to ruccourt and senten	FINDING &	persons by the use of	and between Mand inclusive, to conspire and dinhattan Bank, Jich was in the bank, the deposit of a dangerous	y to lating To the defendant, d take from to amaica, N.Y. care, custody sits of which lace in jeopar weapon	with another, did kno he presence of employ-approximately \$73,594 y, control management & were then and there rdy the lives of said
ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION  In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general conc. as of probation set out reverse side of this judgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation any time during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by law, may issue a warrant and any time during the probation period.  The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends,  It is ordered that the Clerk delia certified copy of this judgm and commitment to the U.S. is shall or other qualified officer.	SENTENCE	was shown, or appeared to the court, hereby committed to the custody of the on count 2 pursuant count 3 pursuant to	e Attorney General or his au	thorized representative for	(a) (2) and 5 years on
ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION  In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general condition set out reverse side of this judgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, any time during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by law, may issue a warrant and probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.  The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends,  It is ordered that the Clerk delia a certified copy of this judgm and commitment to the U.S.A. shall or other qualified officer.					
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The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends, a west of copy of the name Incoment and Conc.; meet

COMMITMENT RECOMMEN-DATION

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

IGNED BY ed muhler

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## DeChiara-direct

MR. BORG: Your Honor, I will get to the objection, but if these photos are to be introduced into evidence now prior to the Government's authenticity of them, there is always the liklihood that the jury may now become the expert on identification and try to compare them, so even before attempting to admit these they will have to prove the authenticity. Just putting them in evidence now will mean that the jury will look and come to compare them with the defendant and make their own identification.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. BORG: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection?

MS. SEYBERT: Same objection that he would have.

THE COURT: Well, the objection is overruled.

I will admit them.

The only thing that concerns me is the old problem of introducing mug shots, and I think that what you will have to do before you show them to the jury is to cut it in half or make other photographs and substitute for them, or enlarge them, because I don't think the jury ought to know that this is a mug shot, certainly not at this point.

witness leaves the stand --

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THE COURT: Why should you do it now, I want it done before the jury sees it, that is all, not before the witness leaves the stand.

MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, I can call up the F.B.I. photographer or -- I don't know how soon it can be done.

THE COURT: You can get another shot of it or cut the photograph in half.

MS. O'BRIEN: I have no objection to cutting it in half.

THE COURT: It now stands side by side, you will have a side view and a front view, and you can cut off the number so that they don't look as if something is hidden.

MS. O'BRIEN: I have no objection to cutting off the lower portion, to cut off the evidence stickers, but if we cut off the front view and the side view --

THE COURT: People don't usually see front and side views except in a mug shot, that is the only place I know of, and I want to avoid any charge that there was prejudice here in the introduction of this exhibit because the jury can interpret this as being a mug shot, that is the only objection that I find for these photographs.

The other, of course, is that it is subject to connection, and if you can't connect it I will have to strike it.

Now somebody had to be present to prove that this defendant looked like that picture at the time.

MS. O'BRIEN: Yes, your Honor, but that is not the problem, I just feel that severing them in half would radically alter the way these were shown to this witness, that is the way it was shown to the witness.

THE COURT: That doesn't matter, this witness says that these photographs look like the man that held up the bank, they are introduced into evidence before the jury sees them but all prejudicial material has to be removed. The prejudicial material is that the front and side view looks like a mug shot, which it is.

Now if you find a way of eliminating that prejudice then it will be shown to the jury, if it can't be, then it won't be shown.

MS. O'BRIEN: Can we come up with the fiction that this is an army photograph.

THE COURT: No, no, no, I won't allow these side and front views to be shown side by side.

If they are cut and if they look like two different

that it is a front view, it is somewhat of a front shot.

- -

MS. O'BRIEN: That is ridiculous.

MR. BORG: People don't pose that way.

THE COURT: If this were in a photo album you would think he was skiing up in Vermont.

If this were separated from this (indicating), cut it in half then after that I will ask you to put any objection you want on the record and how you suggest that it be altered to avoid the prejudice I indicated, and I will then listen to you or at least you will be allowed to make a record of it.

This is proper, I have used this any number of times in any number of cases.

(At this point the Clerk cut a photograph in half composed of two individual photographs.)

THE COURT: All right.

If you want to now, since we have altered the exhibit, show it to the witness and ask whether she still says that looks like the individual who robbed the bank --

MS. O'BRIEN: Shall I show it to her now?

MR. BORG: Are we going to show the jury two
photographs or just one?

THE COURT: The two halves, both are admitted into evidence.

DeChiara-direct

MR. BORG: Then they will see the side view by itself and if the jury compares, then they will know that it is a mug shot.

THE COURT: Mrs. DeChiara, do those pictures look like the man who robbed the bank with the exception that you noted before?

THE WITNESS: I would Lay so.

(Continued on next page)

DeChiara-direct 124 26 THE COURT: What is the objection. 2 MR. BORG: The objection is based on the fact 3 that even though they are cut in half and one is a 4 front view and one is a side view, if the jury sees 5 them together as one exhibit it will be obvious 6 that it is a mug shot. 7 THE COURT: Well, all right. 8 Any other objection. 9 MR. BORG: No, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 The objection is overruled. Now you mark those 12 exhibits -- what is that exhibit? 13 THE CLERK: That particular exhibit, that one 14 is 5A. 15 THE COURT: This will be 5B. 16 THE CLERK: There is 5A until F inclusive. 17 THE COURT: Then mark this one picture as 5G 18 and the other picture as 5H. 19 THE CLERK: So marked. 20 That is in evidence, your Honor? 21 THE COURT: Yes, in evidence. 22 THE CLERK: So marked. THE COURT: Seat the jury. 24 Now if you want to show it to them --25

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## DeChiara-direct

THE COURT: They certainly do and I assume they are not of this defendant.

MS. SEYBERT: One is pretty similar to the photograph that is being admitted into evidence at this point.

THE COURT: That may even show the difference more than show the similarities.

THE CLERK: These are also in evidence.

THE COURT: They are in evidence.

THE CLERK: 5B, C, D, E and F previously marked for identification are now marked in evidence.

THE COURT: All right, seat the jury.

There is writing on the back of all the other mug shots, and so I will ask that the jury not turn them over.

Is that all right?

MS. O'BRIEN: It is fine, your Honor.

MR. BORG: I'm sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: What is the name, as a matter of fact one of them says Chase Manhattan Bank,

40 West 34th Street.

Now does that mean that he was a suspect in another robbery at the Chase Manhattan Bank?

That is dated 8/17 -- I am sorry, 3/22/74.

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Are you giving information away here?

DeChiara-direct

THE F.B.I.AGENT: No, that probably was a suspect in another bank robbery.

MR. BORG: Yes, that is what he is saying and -THE COURT: I certainly don't want the jury to see these shots -- I mean to see this.

The F.B.I. AGENT: If you want to cross it out. THE COURT: I don't know, if it is crossed out -if I tell them not to turn them over and read them, I'm sure they won't.

MR. BORG: I have no objection to having them turn it over.

THE COURT: That I wouldn't want, I don't want any confusion, I don't want any advantage, I don't want any disadvantage.

The only other thing I suggest is that he just blank it out before you show them to them.

Now if you want to just do that, and just put the stickers which are on the back, put stickers on, then we won't have a problem.

Now you can show them after cross-examination, too.

Just cover the backs.

MS. O'BRIEN: Do you want the backs crossed out?

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## DeChiara-direct

THE COURT: No, covered, covered with paper, stapled or pasted.

MS. O'BRIEN: All right, all right, why don't you paste them.

THE COURT: Martin says it is not in his union contract, you are supposed to do that.

THE CLERK: I will do it as soon as I seat the jury.

THE COURT: All right, seat the jury and Martin will do it during cross-examination, and when it is all done he will turn them over to you and you can do whatever you want with them.

MS. O'BRIEN: All right.

(At 4:35 p.m. the jury took its place in the jury box.)

THE COURT: You had better ask that question about 5G and 5H.

MS. O'BRIEN: Okay.

#### DIRECT EXAMINATION

# BY MS. O'BRIEN CONTINUING:

Q Mrs. DeChiara, I'm going to show you two
photographs that have been marked 5G and 5H and ask you if
this is a photograph of the individual that you have selected
from a prior photographic spread sometime within the month of

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.1	31		DeChiara-direct 129	
2	the	robbery.		
3		Α .	Is this the photograph I selected?	
4	1	Q	Yes.	
5		, A	Yes	
6		¥	THE COURT: Objection sustained, objection	
7		sustai	ned.	
8			Look at those photographs.	
9			Do you say that those look like the bank robbe	13
10			THE WITNESS: Yes.	
'n			THE COURT: All right.	
12		18	MS. O'BRIEN: I move for their admittance into	,
13		eviden	nce.	
14		•	I have no further questions.	
15			THE COURT: They have all been in.	
16		У	Mr. Borg, you may proceed.	
17			(Continued on next page)	
DS fls 18				
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De Chiara-redirect

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THE COURT: Didn't you have this Ms. O'Brien?

MS. O'BRIEN: Yes, your Honor.

Can you tell the jury now which are the individuals -- which of the individuals you selected on this occasion.

No. 4.

MS. O'BRIEN: I move to have the jury view these after they have been marked in evidence.

THE COURT: Have they been marked?

MS. O'BRIEN: I don't believe so.

THE CLERK: Yes, Judge.

MS. O'BRIEN: I move to admit both of them in evidence.

THE CLERK: 2 is in evidence, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the application?

MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, I would move to have both these photographs submitted in evidence and shown to the jury.

THE COURT: Give them to the foreman.

MS. O'BRIEN: Equally so with the photographic spread, your Honor, Government's Exhibit 5-B through 5-H, your Honor.

THE COURT: 5-A is not submitted, right?

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that was shown to you by the FBI agents?

answer.

picture.

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Yes, I think they are.

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MR. BORG: I am sorry, I didn't hear the

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(Answer read.)

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MS. O'BRIEN: May I show them Government's

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Exhibits 5-A and and 5-G and H?

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THE COURT: We don't have to go over that

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again. You are not being shown the actual photo-

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graph that this witness selected from the group

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because of certain questions of law that I ruled

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on. There is no mystery to it at all. This

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witness has said that it is a duplicate of that

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All right. Anything further?

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MS. O'BRIEN: May I show those pictures to

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the jury, your Honor, 5-G and 5-H?

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THE COURT: It may take too long. If there are no other questions, you can show those

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pictures tomorrow morning at the outset.

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MS. O'BRIEN: I have no other questions of this witness, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Anyone else? Any other ques-

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tions of this witness before I excuse her, Mr. Borg,

# 171 Hoggard - direct I'm going to show you six photographs, Government's 1 0 2 Exhibits 5A through D, and ask you if these are the six photo-3 graphs that were shown to you by FBI agents? 4 Yes. 5 On that occasionwhen you were first shown those 6 photographs did you on that date select anyone of those 7 photographs as being the photograph of the shorter dark-8 haired robber? 9 As the one that looked like him. 10 One that looked like him? 0 11 Yes. Can you please tell us which photograph you 12 Q 13 selected? 14 This one (indicating). THE COURT: Let the record show the witness 15 16 pointed out 5A. Could you please tell us what characteristics 17 of the man in that photograph resembled the robber? 18 19 His hair, his mustache and his eyes .. 20 Anything further? Q 21 No, no, sir. Would you say the hair style was the same or 22 similar to the hair style of the individual that robbed 23

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the bank?

Yes.

Hoggard - direct 9 I show you Government's Exhibit 5G and 5H and 2 Q ask you if this is a duplicate of the photograph that you 3 selected, Government's Exhibit 5A? 4 Duplicate? 5 A 6 Yes. 0 Is that the same photograph? 7 It looks like it. 8 MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, may I show to the 9 jury Government's Exhibit 5B through H? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MS. O'BRIEN: Thank you. 12 (Exhibits circulated amongst jurors.) 13 MS. O'BRIEN: I have no further questions, your 14 Honor. 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. BORG: 17 Mrs. Hoggard, when you looked at the photos, 18 you saw another group of photos, didn't you? 19 Yes. 20 You didn't pick anybody out of that, did you? 21 0 Yeah, I think I did. 22 A You picked out other photographs? 23 No, I didn't. I just, you know, I said that 24 before I got to that one I had picked out some photos. 25

Carbone - cross - Borg 7 1 witness who testified here, testified that she selected 2 Number 5? 3 Yes, I do. 4 You recall that? 5 Yes. 6 Do you recall her saying that if she had to 7 assign a number as to degree of certainty, she said about 8 eighty? Not at the lineup. A 10 No, no, today, on the witness stand. Q 11 Yesterday? 12 Yes. 13 I believe I recall that, yes. 14 She said about eighty; is that right? Q 15 I think that's right. 16 And to Number 5? Q 17 That's correct. 18 And you were present at the lineup; is that 19 correct? 20 Yes, I was. 21 Would you tell the Jury if you know the identity 22 of Number 5? 23 Yes, I do. 24 Tell the Jury. Q

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1	8	Carbone - cross - Borg
2	A	Special Agent Jerry Lang of the FBI.
3	Q	She picked out an FBI agent?
4	A	Yes, she did.
5		MR. BORG: I have nothing else.
6	Q	She picked out an FBI agent as being the
7	shorter man;	right?
8	A	She didn't say it was the shorter man to me,
9	sir.	
10	Q	Well, sir, you had Mr. Thomas Murphy, who is
11	sitting there	today, in that lineup, didn't you?
12	A	Yes, I did.
13	Q	And you had Agent Number 5 standing there also?
14	A	Yes, I did.
15	Q	And she didn't pick out Mr. Murphy, did she?
16	A	No, she didn't.
17	Q	What is the agent's name she picked out?
18	A	Jerry Lang.
19		MR. BORG: Thank you.
,20		THE COURT: Mrs. Seybert.
21	CROSS-EXAMIN	ATION
2	BY MS. SEYBE	RT:
2	Q	Mr. Carbone, when was the lirst occasion you
2	had to speak	with Mr. Widman?
2	A	I believe it was October 2, 1974.

- 11							
1	Leader-direct						
2	graphic spread, sir?						
	A A few days after or so.						
3	Q A few days after what, sir?						
4 5	A After the robbery.						
6	Q After the robbery?						
	A Yes.	1					
7	Q On that occasion, were you able to select any						
8	photograph from that spread, spread of six photographs, were						
9	you able to select anyone as being the shorter of the two						
10	robbers?						
11	A Yes.						
12	nlosse tell us which photograph						
13							
14	you selected?						
15	A This.						
	THE COURT: All Fight. Det site						
16	the witness pointed to Exhibit 3 "						
17	Now, can you tell us, sir, in what way that						
18	photograph, 5-A, resembles the shorter robber?						
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2	사용도 HONGE 시간 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1	e					
2							
2	2						
2	23   he height from the photograph?						
,							
	A No. But I						
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Med 1. murphy Bores

STATE OF NEW YORK ) : SS.
COUNTY OF RICHMOND )

ROBERT BAILEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 286 Richmond Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 10302. That on the day of many, 1975 deponent served the within appearance upon MJ. The action of the served the within appearance upon MJ. The action of the served the within appearance upon MJ. The action of the served the within appearance upon MJ. The action of the served the within appearance upon the served the served the within appearance upon the served the served the served the served the within appearance upon the served the se

attonrye(s) for Cypallieo

in this action, at 225 admen Plaza

Brooklyn, N7.

the address(es) designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing 3 true copies of same enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States post office department within the State of New York.

ROBERT BATLEY

Sworn to before me, this

Sday of / Bare

, 1975.

1 miles

Notary Public, State of New York

No. 43-0132945

Qualified in Richmond County Commission Expires March 30, 1976